Saturday, 18 October 2008

Hawala 102

BY Sam Vaknin

I. OVERVIEW

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, attention was drawn to the age-old, secretive, and globe-spanning banking system developed in Asia and known as "Hawala" (to change, in Arabic). It is based on a short term, discountable, negotiable, promissory note (or bill of exchange) called "Hundi". While not limited to Moslems, it has come to be identified with "Islamic Banking".

Islamic Law (Sharia'a) regulates commerce and finance in the Fiqh Al Mua'malat, (transactions amongst people). Modern Islamic banks are overseen by the Shari'a Supervisory Board of Islamic Banks and Institutions ("The Shari'a Committee").

The Shi'a "Islamic Laws according to the Fatawa of Ayatullah al Uzama Syed Ali al-Husaini Seestani" has this to say about Hawala banking:

"2298. If a debtor directs his creditor to collect his debt from the third person, and the creditor accepts the arrangement, the third person will, on completion of all the conditions to be explained later, become the debtor. Thereafter, the creditor cannot demand his debt from the first debtor."

The prophet Muhammad (a cross border trader of goods and commodities by profession) encouraged the free movement of goods and the development of markets.

Numerous Moslem scholars railed against hoarding and harmful speculation (market cornering and manipulation known as "Gharar"). Moslems were the first to use promissory notes and assignment, or transfer of debts via bills of exchange ("Hawala").

Among modern banking instruments, only floating and, therefore, uncertain, interest payments ("Riba" and "Jahala"), futures contracts, and forfeiting are frowned upon. But agile Moslem traders easily and often circumvent these religious restrictions by creating "synthetic Murabaha (contracts)" identical to Western forward and futures contracts. Actually, the only allowed transfer or trading of debts (as distinct from the underlying commodities or goods) is under the Hawala.

"Hawala" consists of transferring money (usually across borders and in order to avoid taxes or the need to bribe officials) without physical or electronic transfer of funds. Money changers ("Hawaladar") receive cash in one country, no questions asked. Correspondent hawaladars in another country dispense an identical amount (minus minimal fees and commissions) to a recipient or, less often, to a bank account. E-mail, or letter ("Hundi") carrying couriers are used to convey the necessary information (the amount of money, the date it has to be paid on) between Hawaladars. The sender provides the recipient with code words (or numbers, for instance the serial numbers of currency notes), a digital encrypted message, or agreed signals (like handshakes), to be used to retrieve the money. Big Hawaladars use a chain of middlemen in cities around the globe.

But most Hawaladars are small businesses. Their Hawala activity is a sideline or moonlighting operation. "Chits" (verbal agreements) substitute for certain written records. In bigger operations there are human "memorizers" who serve as arbiters in case of dispute. The Hawala system requires unbounded trust. Hawaladars are often members of the same family, village, clan, or ethnic group. It is a system older than the West. The ancient Chinese had their own "Hawala" - "fei qian" (or "flying money").

Arab traders used it to avoid being robbed on the Silk Road. Cheating is punished by effective ex-communication and "loss of honour" - the equivalent of an economic death sentence. Physical violence is rarer but not unheard of. Violence sometimes also erupts between money recipients and robbers who are after the huge quantities of physical cash sloshing about the system. But these, too, are rare events, as rare as bank robberies. One result of this effective social regulation is that commodity traders in Asia shift hundreds of millions of US dollars per trade based solely on trust and the verbal commitment of their counterparts.

  • Hawala arrangements are used to avoid customs duties, consumption taxes, and other trade-related levies.
  • Suppliers provide importers with lower prices on their invoices, and get paid the difference via Hawala.
  • Legitimate transactions and tax evasion constitute the bulk of Hawala operations.
  • Modern Hawala networks emerged in the 1960's and 1970's to circumvent official bans on gold imports in Southeast Asia and to facilitate the transfer of hard earned wages of expatriates to their families ("home remittances") and their conversion at rates more favourable (often double) than the government's.
  • Hawala provides a cheap (it costs c. 1% of the amount transferred), efficient, and frictionless alternative to morbid and corrupt domestic financial institutions. It is Western Union without the hi-tech gear and the exorbitant transfer fees.
  • Unfortunately, these networks have been hijacked and compromised by drug traffickers (mainly in Afganistan and Pakistan), corrupt officials, secret services, money launderers, organized crime, and terrorists.
  • Pakistani Hawala networks alone move up to 5 billion US dollars annually according to estimates by Pakistan's Minister of Finance, Shaukut Aziz. In 1999,
  • Institutional Investor Magazine identified 1100 money brokers in Pakistan and transactions that ran as high as 10 million US dollars apiece.

As opposed to stereotypes, most Hawala networks are not controlled by Arabs, but by Indian and Pakistani expatriates and immigrants in the Gulf.

  • The Hawala network in India has been brutally and ruthlessly demolished by Indira Ghandi (during the emergency regime imposed in 1975), but Indian nationals still play a big part in international Hawala networks.
  • Similar networks in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Bangladesh have also been eradicated.
    The OECD's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) says that:
    "Hawala remains a significant method for large numbers of businesses of all sizes and individuals to repatriate funds and purchase gold.... It is favoured because it usually costs less than moving funds through the banking system, it operates 24 hours per day and every day of the year, it is virtually completely reliable, and there is minimal paperwork required."

(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), "Report on Money Laundering Typologies 1999-2000," Financial Action Task Force, FATF-XI, February 3, 2000, at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TY2000_en.pdf )

  • Hawala networks closely feed into Islamic banks throughout the world and to commodity trading in South Asia.
  • There are more than 200 Islamic banks in the USA alone and many thousands in Europe, North and South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states (especially in the free zone of Dubai and in Bahrain), Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other South East Asian countries.
  • By the end of 1998, the overt (read: tip of the iceberg) liabilities of these financial institutions amounted to 148 billion US dollars.
  • They dabbled in equipment leasing, real estate leasing and development, corporate equity, and trade/structured trade and commodities financing (usually in consortia called "Mudaraba").

While previously confined to the Arab peninsula and to south and east Asia, this mode of traditional banking became truly international in the 1970's, following the unprecedented flow of wealth to many Moslem nations due to the oil shocks and the emergence of the Asian tigers.

Islamic banks joined forces with corporations, multinationals, and banks in the West to finance oil exploration and drilling, mining, and agribusiness. Many leading law firms in the West (such as Norton Rose, Freshfields, Clyde and Co. and Clifford Chance) have "Islamic Finance" teams which are familiar with Islam-compatible commercial contracts.

II. HAWALA AND TERRORISM

Recent anti-terrorist legislation in the US and the UK allows government agencies to regularly supervise and inspect businesses that are suspected of being a front for the ''Hawala'' banking system, makes it a crime to smuggle more than $10,000 in cash across USA borders, and empowers the Treasury secretary (and its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - FinCEN) to tighten record-keeping and reporting rules for banks and financial institutions based in the USA.

A new inter-agency Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT) was set up.

A 1993 moribund proposed law requiring US-based Halawadar to register and to report suspicious transactions may be revived. These relatively radical measures reflect the belief that the al-Qaida network of Osama bin Laden uses the Hawala system to raise and move funds across national borders.

  • A Hawaladar in Pakistan (Dihab Shill) was identified as the financier in the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. But the USA is not the only country to face terrorism financed by Hawala networks.
  • A few months ago, the Delhi police, the Indian government's Enforcement Directorate (ED), and the Military Intelligence (MI) arrested six Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF) terrorists.
  • The arrests led to the exposure of an enormous web of Hawala institutions in Delhi, aided and abetted, some say, by the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan's security services).
  • The Hawala network was used to funnel money to terrorist groups in the disputed Kashmir Valley.

Luckily, the common perception that Hawala financing is paperless is wrong. The transfer of information regarding the funds often leaves digital (though heavily encrypted) trails.

  • Couriers and "contract memorizers", gold dealers, commodity merchants, transporters, and moneylenders can be apprehended and interrogated.
  • Written, physical, letters are still the favourite mode of communication among small and medium Hawaladars, who also invariably resort to extremely detailed single entry bookkeeping.
  • And the sudden appearance and disappearance of funds in bank accounts still have to be explained.
  • Moreover, the sheer scale of the amounts involved entails the collaboration of off shore banks and more established financial institutions in the West.

Such flows of funds affect the local money markets in Asia and are instantaneously reflected in interest rates charged to frequent borrowers, such as wholesalers.

  • Spending and consumption patterns change discernibly after such influxes.
  • Most of the money ends up in prime world banks behind flimsy business facades.
  • Hackers in Germany claimed (without providing proof) to have infiltrated Hawala-related bank accounts.

The problem is that banks and financial institutions - and not only in dodgy offshore havens ("black holes" in the lingo) - clam up and refuse to divulge information about their clients.

  • Banking is largely a matter of fragile trust between bank and customer and tight secrecy. Bankers are reluctant to undermine either.
  • Banks use mainframe computers which can rarely be hacked through cyberspace and can be compromised only physically in close co-operation with insiders.
  • The shadier the bank - the more formidable its digital defenses.
  • The use of numbered accounts (outlawed in Austria, for instance, only recently) and pseudonyms (still possible in Lichtenstein) complicates matters.
  • Bin Laden's accounts are unlikely to bear his name. He has collaborators.

Hawala networks are often used to launder money, or to evade taxes. Even when employed for legitimate purposes, to diversify the risk involved in the transfer of large sums, Hawaladars apply techniques borrowed from money laundering.

  • Deposits are fragmented and wired to hundreds of banks the world over ("starburst").
  • Sometimes, the money ends up in the account of origin ("boomerang"). Hence the focus on payment clearing and settlement systems.
  • Most countries have only one such system, the repository of data regarding all banking (and most non-banking) transactions in the country. Yet, even this is a partial solution. Most national systems maintain records for 6-12 months, private settlement and clearing systems for even less.

Yet, the crux of the problem is not the Hawala or the Hawaladars.

The corrupt and inept governments of Asia are to blame for not regulating their banking systems, for over-regulating everything else, for not fostering competition, for throwing public money at bad debts and at worse borrowers, for over-taxing, for robbing people of their life savings through capital controls, for tearing at the delicate fabric of trust between customer and bank (Pakistan, for instance, froze all foreign exchange accounts two years ago).

Perhaps if Asia had reasonably expedient, reasonably priced, reasonably regulated, user-friendly banks - Osama bin Laden would have found it impossible to finance his mischief so invisibly.

The Rest @ Behavioral Science Blogspot


Sam Vaknin is the author of "Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited" and "After the Rain - How the West Lost the East". He is a columnist in "Central Europe Review", United Press International (UPI) and ebookweb.org and the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory, Suite101 and searcheurope.com. Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of Macedonia.

His web site:

http://samvak.tripod.com/

Thursday, 9 October 2008

Islamic Banking: Occasional Paper, No 49 - Iran

Islamic Banking: Occasional Paper, No 49
By Zubair Iqbal, Abbas Mirakhor

Published by International Monetary Fund, 1987
ISBN 0939934825, 9780939934829
62 pages


This book was published after Post-Revoutionary Iran set in place Ismalic reforms. This is a Shi'ia approach, different set of methods of reform from the the current post 9-11 Islamic Banking pheonomenon, which is guided by Sunny economists.


Iranian Banks have somewhat different practices, and have differeing fatwas related to Haram. Therefore they do not apear to automtatically participate in Sukuks and other instruments issued by other Islamic finanace groups.

More Study is needed.

Saturday, 4 October 2008

Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran

ISO Country code:
IRA

SWIFT Country code:
IA
Central Bank:
(The Central Bank of Iran) ; Established: 1960; Bank of Note issue
Monetary unit:
Rial(IRR) = 100 Dinars
Capital:
Tehran
Financial centre:

Tehran
Language:
Persian (Farsi)
Population:
66,000,000
Area:
1,648,195 sq. km.
± GMT:
+3 ½ hours

Banking hours:
Saturday to Wednesday 08.00-16.00

Public holidays:
2008:Oct 1; Dec 8,16. 2009: Jan 7,19; Feb 11; Mar 9,18, 20; Jul 20; Aug 8; Sep 9,21; Oct 15; Nov 28

Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran

Thursday, 18 September 2008

Dahabshiil and Halawa's Explorinn Wirless Phones for Money Transfers

In countries where few have access to formal banking, mobile transfers provide crucial support for families with breadwinners abroad

There are dozens of different networks by which the world's estimated 200 million migrant workers transfer money to their home towns: from transnational behemoths such as Western Union to local, traditional systems such as the Chinese fei ch'ien ("flying monkey"). Ghanaian migrant workers in Berlin can deposit cash in one of the city's transfer agencies; at the other end, a hairdresser in Accra keeps a pile of cash next to his clippers to dispense funds to the workers' families. But all networks - from hundi in Pakistan to phei kwan in Thailand - could soon be eclipsed by the humble text message.

Globally, the total amount sent home by migrant workers through remittance transfers is roughly $300bn (£170bn); money sent via informal networks and money laundering is believed to add a further $150bn. Remittances far outstrip foreign aid to the developing world and can contribute up to a third of a country's GDP.

But "mobile remittances" - small sums sent via text message - are transforming the market. This may not sound hugely significant in an age of internet banking, but in countries where few have access to formal banking, mobile transfers provide crucial support for families with breadwinners abroad.

Branded with snappy names such as GCash and M-Pesa, the first networks were launched in the Philippines and Kenya last year, with services in India and Afghanistan coming soon. Users pay cash into an "mWallet"; and whenever they want to transfer money using their phone, the recipient gets a text message, which provides them with a code to show to a local agent.
  • The mobile networks are able to compete in an already crowded marketplace with low transaction costs and flexibility: while the usual wire transfer companies take a 10 per cent commission on transfers, GCash costs as little as 1 per cent.
  • It is also a formal system of remittance at a time when informal networks face harassment by financial authorities.

Because of US suspicions that the 9/11 attacks were funded by money laundering, many hawala networks, supplying remittances to families in the Middle East and Africa, were shut down (though the 9/11 Commission later found that the attacks had been funded using ordinary wire transfers).

According to a 2005 UK government report: "The closure of hawala outlets in the US and UK after the 11 September terrorist attacks left many Somali families destitute."

  • The Horn of Africa transfer company Dahabshiil is investigating providing mobile transfer to help workers stung by prohibitively high commissions since the traditional networks shut down.
  • Paul Harvey, who has carried out research for the Overseas Development Institute into the role remittances play in development, notes: "Somalia has very widespread mobile-phone networks, considering its political instability, so there are all sorts of exciting possibilities for using mobile networks."
  • The mobile transfer networks could also change the way humanitarian agencies administer aid, as a pilot scheme launched during the Kenyan post-election violence this year demonstrated.
  • With the country in chaos, cattle rustlers took advantage of the security vacuum in the remote Kerio Valley to attack communities and livestock, making the transportation of food, money and materials to affected communities unfeasible. The aid agency Concern Worldwide entered into an agreement with M-Pesa and sent a total of ?36,000 to 560 households within a month.

The scheme highlighted both the advantages and the pitfalls of the transfers. Most importantly for underfunded aid agencies, it was markedly cheaper than normal wire transfer, and quicker and less dangerous than handouts.

  • But although mobile-phone use has increased hugely in Africa over the past decade, 40 per cent of those who required aid in the Kerio Valley did not have access to one.
  • Widespread illiteracy also provided challenges for a project that required the use of text messages.
  • Concern circumvented these problems by liaising with trusted, literate members of the community who owned handsets.

In September, Concern will start a permanent scheme targeting 5,000 families around Kenya in dangerous or isolated areas. Other agencies will be watching with interest. If it takes off, aid workers may find themselves having to add the language of txtspeak to their roster of local dialects.

The Rest @ New Statesman

Tuesday, 9 September 2008

Learn About Money laundering

Bank Maskan

Bank Maskan

POBox 11365-3499No.247, Ferdowsi Ave. TehranIran
Telephone:
Facsimile:
Website:
+98(21)6709655
+98(21)6703262
http://www.bank-maskan.org

Bank of Interest

Monday, 1 September 2008

Who owns Iqra TV?

Who owns Iqra TV?
Who owns Iqra TV? Saudi religious channel
  • Best Answer the multimillionere saudi Bussiness man (Saleh Kamel)..who owns the all ART channels including IqraTV